Abstract
Problem Specification
Since 1993 there has been an ongoing debate in the Dutch flower industry, about the increasing imports of foreign flower products at the Dutch flower auctions and about the use of new Information Technology (IT) in this industry. After a referendu n September 1994 the growers, who are the owners of the auctions, decided to ban foreign grower participation in the auctions during the summer. These efforts to reduce foreign access to the traditional Dutch auctions, led buyer organizations and foreign growers to announce the creation of competing auctions. Indeed, the development and introduction of Tele Flower Auction (TFA) is one of the initiatives in response to import restrictions by the traditional Dutch flower auctions. TFA is an electronic altemative that enables buyers to trade at a distance; this alternative is currently exploited by an import organization called East African Flowers (EAF).
This article aims
to describe the entrance of TFA i lands; to give an overview of TFA and in TFA; to explain through certain propos understanding of the reasons for the success of new entrants and the role of IT.
This article further shows that IT enables new ways of competition and coordin which individuals and services. It also show market, and the increasing cross
The article is organi descriptive framework is be used to describe the characteristics of the Dut The action of imp0 growers and auctions is explained. In section 4 the concept and development
propositions are deve There are many the0 cal studies of auctions [7, 8, 14, 20, 21] tics of auction tions for drainage that neigbhor firm a lease than non-neighbor firms, that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions, and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the BayesianNash equilibrium. Cramton [7] described the full history of bidding dealing with the successful Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction. Rothkopf and Harstad [21] critically analyzed the gaps between the existing theory and the reality of auctions. For theorists, Rothkopf and Harstad advise attention to the particulars of how auctions are modeled. They argue that modelling improvements will be of more direct value than use of equilibrium concepts more subtle than Nash's or new theorems that apply only to oversimplified models. Research presented in this article follows their advice. ples of relevant issues supporting an effective design.
What is lacking, however, is a systematic classification of various complex economic issues that arise when designing and implementing electronic markets.
Based on the analysis of these studies, we develop a framework to describe electronic auctions and apply this framework to formulate relevant propositions with regard to successes or failures of new entrants and the role of IT.
This descriptive framework consists of eight elements, which will be discussed next; see Figure 1 .
Electronic Markets
Research on the effects of IT on exchange organizations and processes is relatively new. Early research applied transaction costs and agency theory to predict shifts from hierarchies to market form of organizations [11,19]. The central argument of this line of research was that IT would improve communication, search, monitoring and information sorting capabilities, thereby reducing transaction costs and enabling purchasers to take advantage of production economies available in markets. A critical drawback inherent in this analysis was the definition and treatment of markets in abstract economic terms (;.e., markets coordinate economic activity through a price mechanism). In reality, different market structures exist, e.g. direct search, brokered, dealer and auction markets. Each of these structures organizes the trading process and related information processing activities in different ways. 
I . Auction Results
Results or effects of the auction can be distinguished into results for (i) sellers, (ii) buyers, and (iii) intermedjaries (auction house) [24]. Examples are prices of auctioned objects, transaction volumes, transaction speed, price volatility, and feasibility.
IT Innovations
New IT innovations may be adopted and used by sellers and buyers, in different ways. We shall pay special interest to the way these innovations influence trust among sellers and buyers. We shall also study which (new) information can be stored, sent, and retrieved by IT.
Auction Rules
Auction rules deal with statements of what can, should or must be done in certain auction circumstances. For example, specific auction rules may concern quality control.
There are also auction rules concerning the role of the auctioneer.
Trust
Trust deals with the belief, or willingness to believe, that one can rely on the goodness, strength, and ability of somebody (the seller or the buyer) or something (for example, IT innovations). Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community [IO] . Fukuyama [1O, p.27] argues that: 'people who do not trust one another will end up cooperating only under a system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated, and enforced, sometimes by coercive means. This legal apparatus, serving as a substitute for trust, entails what economists call "transaction costs"'.
Buyers
Buyers can be characterized by their decision-making behaviors (bidding strategies). In a Dutch flower auction there are many buyers bidding on each object; for example, in the TFA case there are 160 buyers.
Objects
Auctioned objects deal with the characterization of the exchanged products in terms of product characteristics, quality, length of stems, number of units, and stems per unit.
Sellers
Sellers can be characterized by their decision-making behaviors (selling strategies). In a Dutch flower auction each object is sold by a single seller; usually the seller is the producer of the object.
Competition with other markets
The literature shows that most research on auctions has a single isolated auction point of view [21] . In Dutch flower auctions this viewpoint is too narrow. Dutch flower auctions are marketplaces in an international flower market. There are other market channels between sellers and buyers, such as the mediation offices. Therefore we introduce an extra element, namely competition with other markets (auctions, and market channels). We shall not primarily focus on this element, but shall consider it to be an important part of the environment.
In section 4 and 5 we shall study one practical case, namely the entrance of TFA into the Netherlands, to explore relevant propositions dealing with the success or failure of new entrants and the role of IT. The nature of this type of research is explorative. Such a case can be used for so-called analytical generalization, not statistical generalization [29] . We use the case study method, because it enables 'reality' to be captured in considerably greater detail than other methods, and it also allows the analysis of a considerably greater n We held interviews, analyzed relevant reports, and obtained archival data. 
Increasing Imports
Imports of cut flowers into ing; they rose by 78% betw share of the European Community (EC) countries growing. Spain, Kenya an Zimbabwe are becoming important suppliers, whereas Israel, Thailand, Colombia, and Ethiopia's supplies were declining over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . In the period 1990-1993 the imports increased dramatically.
Action: Import Reductions
Dutch growers felt that creasing imports was d and Dutch products. For example, the Dutch producers of roses were furious about the decreasing prices the increasing producti and Africa. A survey among 433 growers, 2 tion as the most important threat, and 144 grower ranked auctioning imports as such [25] . Seventy-four nds are increas-1990 [12] . T ne of the main results of ining prices for all imp0 apacities in Southe eptember 1994 showed t wers ranked foreign prod percent of the growers stated that imports had a negative effect on prices at Dutch auctions. Twelve percent of the growers claimed it had a positive effect. A reason for some growers to be positive, might be that they think that import products attract more buyers. Overall, the growers did not agree with the liberal import policy of Dutch auctions at that time. The board of directors of Flower Auction Aalsmeer and Flower Auction Holland intended to continue the liberal import policy. Their argument was that the Dutch flower auctions have to be the center of a global flower market, and not a market place for Dutch products only. In September 1994, both the growers of Flower Auction Aalsmeer and Flower Auction Holland decided to change the import policy and to impose very strict import reductions. They restricted the imports in the summer completely (between June 1, 1995 and September 15, 1995); they determined an upper bound of accepted imports during the rest of the year; and they proposed a very tight quality control system on imports.
The import reductions had three main effects (see also 
2.
Prices in the season 1994/1995 decreased; the explanation is weather conditions and currency problems ('the strong guilder'). The impact of lower imports on the auction prices resulted in higher prices, as was expected by growers, but that impact is not clearly visible. Some growers and buyers had the impression flower prices were more volatile. 
Reaction: The Tele Flower Auction

3.
Importers had to find alternative marketing channels to sell their products. One of these importers, EAF, was very innovative, and introduced IT; namely a new electronic alternative called TFA. The Dutch Flower Auction Concept There are approximately 3500 varieties of cut flowers. These varieties are classified into 120 auction groups, according to the variety, size of the lot, and quality of the flowers. Dutch flower auctions use a clock for price discovery, as follows. The computerized auction clock in the room provides the buyers with information on producer, product, unit of currency, quality, and minimum purchase quantity. The flowers are transported through the auction room, and are shown to the buyers. The clock hand starts at a high price determined by the auctioneer, and drops until a buyer stops the clock by pushing a button. The auctioneer asks the buyer by intercom, how many units of the lot he or she will buy. The buyer provides the number of units. The clock is then reset, and the process begins for the left-over flowers, sometimes introducing a new minimum purchase quantity, until all units of the lot are sold. Table 2 illustrates the auction process by two examples with empirical auction data. The first rows deal with producer 1234 (column 2), who is responsible for transactions 408 to 420 (column 1). On January 4, 1996 this producer delivered roses (product group 52), or more specifically the brown rose 'Leonidas' (product number 10288). He delivered four lots of that type of rose (column 4). These lots had the same type of quality (AI), but were different in length (70, 60, 50, and 80 centimeters respectively) and in amounts of 9, 5, 3, and 12 units respectively. The first lot was auctioned, and buyer 3782 took 1 unit (out of 9) for a price of 93 cents per stem. The rest of the lot was auctioned again, and buyer 1854 bought 2 units for 95 cents. Buyers must be physically present in the auction room. In practice, it turns out that the Dutch flower auction is an extremely efficient auction mechanism: it can handle a transaction every four seconds; for example, Flower Auction Aalsmeer handles via 13 clocks 30,000 transactions a day. It also reduces the amount of time that growers must spend on price discovery and bidding; hence they can focus on production. The auction location for the meeting of buyers, quality control and logistics of product r This auction has "backtracking" possibilities: though the price movements are decreasing per sub-lot, the price can be multidirectional (up or down) within the whole lot. Buyers can withdraw their willingness to bu indicate to the auctioneer fewer or more units then they originally intended to at the time they pushed the button. During the auctioning of the lot, buyers produce information on the value of the lot; this information is available to all buyers. Given these characteristics, we call the Dutch flower auction a multi-unit, multiform price Dutch auction. The TFA Concept In the TFA, buyers can bid via their personal computer (PC) screens [2, 9, 26] . Each PC is connected to a fully computerized auction clock. Logistics and price discovery are uncoupled. Flowers are no longer visible for buyers, and buyers are no longer physical in an auction room. The PC provides the buyer with information on the next flower lots. On his PC the buyer can earmark interesting lots, so at the time those lots will be auctioned, the PC will warn the buyer. The PC provides information on the producer, product, unit of currency, quality, and minimum purchase quantity. The underlying auction concept remains the same: Dutch flower auction. On the PC screen the buyer sees the Dutch auction clock. The clock hand starts at a high price, and drops until a buyer stops the clock by pushing the space bar at the key board of the PC. The auctioneer asks the buyer, via an open telephone connection, how many flowers of the lot he or she will buy. The buyer provides the amount. The clock is then reset, and the process begins for the next units, until the remainder of the lot is sold.
Growers send the flowers to EAF, and EAF stores these flowers in Amstelveen. Logistics and price discovery are uncoupled within the auction hall. The distribution of the flowers from the Amstelveen area to the buyer's address is done by transporters of EAF. 
IT Innovations
Compared with traditional auctions, buyers can trade at a distance. TFA provides better and more frequently updated supply information. The speed of the TFA system is amazing. Not only the auctioning process, but also the after-sales process is very fast; sometimes within half a hour products are delivered at the buyer's address. The IT architecture includes S-1000 technology and ISDN connections.
Auction Rules
TFA uses the same auction rules as in traditional Dutch flower auctions. The role of the auctioneer is the same. He identifies buyers, and determines the minimum amount of units.By setting this amount, the auctioneer can try to influence the price level.
Trust
It soon became clear that one of the main propositions of TFA was that the quality of the flowers, determines the buyers' trust in the TFA concept. TFA's motto is: 'Buyers have to trust the quality blindfold', because buyers cannot physically see the product anymore. Still, buyers who are nearby TFA, can inspect the imported flowers; 30% of the buyers do so regularly. Reliable product information and stable quality control are essential. Buyers also trust the IT innovations. One of the reasons seems to be that the Dutch auction clock is still the price discovery mechanism; buyers are used to that mechanism.
Buyers
TFA started with 70 buyers. In March 1995 there were 125 buyers, mainly wholesalers/exporters, attached to TFA; in May 1995 there were 160 buyers (50% located in the Aalsmeer area, the other 50% distributed over the Netherlands). Some buyers say they m i s s the atmosphere of the traditional auction halls, where they could 'feel' the tension in the market. Other buyers prefer working behind the PC screen: they mentioned better concentration and a better overview of the market [2] . All buyers are very impressed by TFA's service, quality of products, and speed of delivery to their addresses. Buyers are very positive about the supply data presented by TFA. Buyers have a better overview of what is auctioned (compared with the traditional Dutch auctions), due to TFA's supply database.
Objects
TFA auctions imported flowers. TFA has strict quality control norms, and provides the standard information on flowers; moreover, TFA also provides positive quality remarks.
Sellers
TFA started with 15 African growers. After the decision to open TFA for others, the number of growers increased rapidly. Growers from Europe, Africa and Asia use it as their marketing channel.
Competition with other markets
The Dutch growers perceived TFA positiv 1995, 68 % of 378 Dutch growers who were were in favor of the import restrictions; 55 % answered that TFA was the best alternative for imported flowers; 26% would like to re-install the liberal import policy [27] . Another interesting aspect is that 10% of the Dutch growers is thinking about choosing TFA as their marketing channel. In 1995 229 growers (in 1994: 269) ranked foreign production as the most important threat, and 92 (in 1994: 144) 
TFA Case Analysis and Propositions
What can we learn from this case study? We think that the TFA case tells the foll story.
New Entrants' Success
The efforts to reduc Dutch auctions, led one of the initiatives ingly, from the beginning the CEO of EAF/TFA (Mr. Simon van der Burg) made clear that TFA was for E the second best solution. EAF preferre strictions; EAF had to create a new market Therefore, EAF moved forward into the flower the new situation, EAF imports flowers, and c and organizes the price discovery proce flowers. It was the first time in Dutch importer organization performs this fun ally, the Dutch flower auctions are established as cooperatives by the Dutch growers. Anoth was the high speed of entrance. The were valid in October 1994; TFA started in March 1995.
So EAF developed and implemented TFA in a few months.
The entrance of TFA was successful for all stakeholders. On average it resulted in the same prices as similar products made at the other Dutch flower auctions. Buyers are impressed by TFA's service, quality of products, and speed of delivery. One buyer stated that 'their logistical process is excellent; although we are very close to Flower Auction Aalsmeer, TFA delivers much faster than Flower Auction Aalsmeer' [3] . The reason is much simpler internal logistical streams, compared with the traditional Dutch auction. After some months TFA attracted more buyers and non-EFA sellers (from, for example, France and India). Some buyers missed the atmosphere of the auction rooms. Others liked the relaxed atmosphere, trading at a distance in their own offices. Some buyers liked the fact that they had a better overview and had to perform fewer administrative efforts. TFA expects a turnover of 100 million guilders for the growing season 1995/1996. Compared with the seven Dutch flower auctions. TFA ranks fourth.
The new entrants' success in general may be defined as the ability of the new entrants to build up significant sales volumes or turnovers, with fair prices for the traded products, in a short time frame. Usually, for the traditional competitors in the industry this will lead to lower sales volumes, turnovers, or price levels.
Quality of Information
Based on our analysis of the TFA case, we propose the following proposition.
Proposition I : IT innovations lead to improved quality of information; improved quality of information leads to a more efficient market, and contribute to new entrants' success.
In the TFA case, the information on the screens, that represents the quality of the flowers, is reliable and precise. The IT innovation provides up-to-date supply information, which gives buyers a better overview. In the TFA case the supply information becomes more distributed among sellers and buyers, which will lead to more efficient markets (see [14] ). Kleijnen [16] presents the many attributes or characteristics that determine the quality of information, such as timeliness, accuracy, aggregation, report mode, retention time, privacy and security, reliability and recovery.
Logistical Performance
We formulate the second proposition.
Proposition 2: IT innovations lead to the uncoupling of logistics from price discovery processes; this leads to better logistical performance, and contributes to new entrants' success.
TFA uncouples logistics and price discovery in the auction hall. Therefore, the internal logistics of the auction hall is much simpler, compared with the traditional auction system. This fact explains why TFA has a much better logistical performance and service level, in the opinion of the buyers. E M paid much attention to the after-sales program (providing transport to the buyers).
Learning costs
We formulate the next proposition.
Proposition 3: Applying IT innovations to unchanged auction rules results in low learning costs, and contributes to new entrants' success.
One of the strengths of TFA is the use of the Dutch flower auction, as the underlying price discovery concept. The buyers are end-users of the system; they are used to work with this concept. They had to learn how to trade via the PC-screen, but these learning costs were relatively low. E M paid much attention to the design of the userinterface of TFA.
Trust
We formulate the next proposition. Proposition 4: Conformance of the actual and the perceived quality of the product, logistical performance, and IT performance result in high trust; high trust contributes to new entrants' success.
In general, sellers and buyers find that TFA keeps their promises concerning quality of products, delivery time of products, and reliability of IT performance. Buyers trust the TFA products. Usually, they get better products than expected from the data provided on the PC screen, due to a centralized quality control program. Buyers also trust F A , because the underlying auction concept is the same: Dutch flower auction. Buyers trust the IT innovation: if a buyer is the first buyer to push the space bar at the key board of the PC, he or she is certain that the computer network transfers this signal fast and reliable, so he or she will be able to buy (part of or all of) the lot.
Competition with other markets
Besides the strengths of TFA, the weaknesses of the traditional Dutch auctions partly explain the success of TFA. The cooperative structure of the Dutch auctions (every single grower has one vote), the complexity of the after-sale logistics (due to the coupling of the logistics with the price discovery process), their inability to implement IT innovations quickly (for example, the failure in 1994 of Flower Auction Aalsmeer to implement the sample-based auction system) further decreased the market share of TFA's competitors. In the sample-based auction system the trustworthiness of the sample, as a representation of the lot, was questioned by the buyers. A detailed analysis of the sample-based auction failure is presented in [24] .
The entrance of TFA into the Dutch floristry industry definitely had a profound impact on the competition in this industry. By opening TFA to non-EAF growers and buyers, TFA built critical mass in a short period. Imports of Flower Auction Aalsmeer decreased with 23 %, whereas the average was 10% for all traltional Dutch auctions [3] . Recently (May 1996) , Flower Auction Aalsmeer decided to re-install the liberal import policy, and to implement an electronic clearinghouse for cut flowers and potted plants. The main reason is that they would like to remain the central market place for cut flowers and potted plants.
Other auctions can have an impact on TFA. For example, Flower Auction Holland decided to copy the TFA concept; recently (August 1996), they introduced their own Tele Auction System. The auctions in Vleuten and Eelde also introduced the Tele Auction principle.
It is difficult to predict the near future of TFA. Currently, TFA works on an innovative concept, presenting digitized images of flowers during the auction process. A complete uncoupling of logistics and price discovery, by sending data in stead of flowers to Amstelveen, might be possible in the near future.
Conclusions
The TFA case demonstrates the way a new entrant may use IT in an innovative way, in order to enter a market and compete with dominant players in that market. This case shows that new entrants can quickly build a competitive advantage. It illustrates the conclusion derived by Clemons, Croson, and Weber [4] concerning the strengths of new entrants in a competitive market.
We proposed a new descriptive framework that identifies relevant elements for describing electronic framework turned out to be useful to desc vant elements of TFA. In the analysis of th we identified constructs relevant to the new entrant and the role of IT; these quality of information, logistical performance, learning costs, and trust. Previous work by Van Heck and Ribbers [24] has already identified important elements for the design of electronic markets, such as convergent motives of stakeholders, high trust, high entry barriers, and electronic market functionality and structure.
We suggest that the next structs and propositions into variables and hypotheses. With the help of multipl case analysis, it will be possible to empirically test ese hypotheses outside the flower industry. We think that in other industries IT also affects new entrants' success; for example, Clemons, Croson, and Weber [4] and telecommunications industry, and the stock other industry settings will further generalize the results presented in this article.
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